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STATE REGULATION OF LATE ABORTION
AND THE PHYSICIAN'S DUTY OF CARE




Seven years after Roe v. Wade,1 its legacy of unresolved issues2 sur-
rounding the abortion decision appears larger than ever before, despite
the growing number of legal opinions interpreting the various ramifica-
tions of Roe v. Wade and its companion case, Doe v. Bolton.3 Perhaps
none of the unresolved issues is more troubling than those concerning the
extent to which a state can regulate the abortion process as the fetus
approaches and attains viability.
Two widely publicized criminal prosecutions and two recent Supreme
Court decisions illustrate these issues. In Commonwealth v. Edelin,4 a
doctor who was convicted of manslaughter following the death after an
abortion of a twenty-one to twenty-four week fetus appealed his conviction
to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. Dr. Edelin and his super-
visor, Dr. Penza, unsuccessfully attempted to abort the fetus by saline
amniocentesis., After repeated attempts failed to produce conditions
suitable for the introduction of the saline solution, Dr. Edelin performed
a hysterotomy.0 He made an incision in the patient's abdomen and then
detached the placenta from the uterine wall, thus cutting off the fetus'
oxygen supply. According to the testimony of a doctor who was observing
the surgery, Dr. Edelin then left his hand in the uterus for three minutes.
7
After removing the fetus and finding no signs of life, he placed it in a
basin.8 The prosecution argued that the fetus was alive after the placenta
was separated from the uterine wall, and that Dr. Edelin had a duty to
care for it. According to the prosecution, the three minute delay in remov-
*Associate Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University. B.A., 1966, Brigham Young University; J.D., 1976, National Law Cen-
ter, George Washington University.
B.A., 1976, Brigham Young University; J.D., 1980, J. Reuben Clark Law
School, Brigham Young University.
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Id. at 165 n.67.
3. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
4. 371 Mass. 497, 359 N.E.2d 4 (1976).
5. For a description of the saline abortion technique, see notes 29-32 and
accompanying text infra.
6. 371 Mass. at 502-03, 359 N.E.2d at 7. For a description of the hysterotomy
abortion technique, see notes 48-52 and accompanying text infra.
7. 371 Mass. at 506-07, 359 N.E.2d at 9.
8. Id. at 503-04, 359 N.E.2d at 7.
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ing the fetus from the uterus caused the infant's death and constituted
manslaughter.9 The defense maintained that the manslaughter statute was
inapplicable unless the fetus was "born alive completely outside the
mother's body."' 0 Edelin's conviction was reversed by a unanimous
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. Five justices voted for acquittal
because of insufficient evidence of the wanton and reckless omission of
care required for manslaughter."3 Three of the five also would have
granted acquittal because there was insufficient evidence of live birth and
a variance between the charges in the indictment and the charges proved.'
2
A sixth justice would have remanded for a new trial because of an in-
adequate jury instruction.13
A second case involving the death of an aborted fetus was State v.
Waddill.'4 In 1978 a California obstetrician was prosecuted for the death
of an infant born alive after an abortion. The defendant performed an
abortion by saline instillation, 15 and instead of the anticipated twenty-two
week fetus, the abortion resulted in the live birth of a thirty-one week
infant. The hospital's chief pediatrician alleged that Dr. Waddill purposely
strangled the infant when it did not expire after the abortion.16 Two trials
both resulted in hung juries. The judge exercised his discretion to dismiss
the case in the interests of justice after the second jury voted eleven to
one for acquittal.' 7
The United States Supreme Court recently considered the case of
another doctor charged with the death of an aborted fetus. In Anders v.
Floyd,'8 Dr. Floyd sought to enjoin his prosecution in a South Carolina
state court on charges of illegal abortion and murder. The doctor was
indicted after the death of a baby boy, who was aborted by Dr. Floyd at
twenty-five weeks gestation via prostaglandin instillation,' 9 and lived for
twenty days.2 0 The three-judge district court enjoined the prosecution,
inferring that the fetus was not viable,2 ' but the Supreme Court vacated
the injunction and remanded the case to the district court for reconsidera-
tion in the light of Colautti v. Franklin.2 2 In a per curiam opinion, the
9. Id. at 507-08, 359 N.E.2d at 9-10.
10. Id. at 508, 359 N.E.2d at 10.
11. Id. at 499, 359 N.E.2d at 5.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 533, 359 N.E.2d at 23.
14. No. C37815 (Cal. Super. Ct., dismissed June 11, 1979).
15. For a description of the saline abortion technique, see notes 29-32 and
accompanying text infra.
16. NawswErx, Apr. S, 1978, at 35.
17. Telephone conversation with Orange County, California, District At-
torney's office (Dec. 12, 1979).
18. 440 U.S. 445 (1979).
19. For a description of prostaglandin instillation, see notes 33-36 and ac-
companying text infra.
20. Floyd v. Anders, 440 F. Supp. 535, 538 (D.S.C. 1977).
21. Id. at 53940.
22. 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
1980]
2
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 3 [1980], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol45/iss3/2
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Court suggested that the district court may have based its conclusion on
an erroneous concept of "viability."23
Pennsylvania's attempt to avoid the tragic situations represented by
the cases of Drs. Edelin, Waddill, and Floyd was invalidated by the United
States Supreme Court in the recent case of Colautti v. Franklin.2 4 The
Court declared unconstitutional sections of the Pennsylvania Abortion
Control Act which had imposed a standard of care on the physician per-
forming an abortion. The statute required the doctor to exercise the
same care to preserve the fetus' life and health as would be required in
the case of a fetus intended to be born alive, and to use the abortion
technique providing the best opportunity for the fetus to be born alive, so
long as a different technique would not be necessary to preserve the
pregnant woman's life or health, when a fetus is viable or "may be viable."25
The Court found the statute to be void for vagueness.2 6
The Edelin, Waddill, and Floyd prosecutions illustrate the need for
states to define the appropriate relationship between the doctor, the
pregnant woman, and the fetus during the performance of late abortions.27
The Colautti decision, however, may foreshadow the difficulties states will
have in drafting legislation that will effectively define that relationship
and be acceptable to the Supreme Court. The purpose of this article is
to explore the possibility of state legislation defining the relationship
between the aborting physician and the fetus so as to protect the state's
interest in potential life. A discussion of late abortion methods will be
followed by a study of the Supreme Court's rulings on late abortion. The
Colautti decision and the problems posed by the decision will be discussed
in detail. The article will conclude with a discussion of current and
suggested state legislation.
II. BACKGROUND: LATE ABORTIONS
A. Late Abortion Methods
An understanding of the problems involved in regulating late abortions
is enhanced by familiarity with the techniques used to induce late abortion
and the potential complications of each method. Abortions performed in
the United States at a time late enough for the fetus to be viable usually
23. 440 U.S. at 445.
24. 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
25. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6605(a) (Purdon 1977).
26. 439 U.S. at 401.
27. An additional case illustrating the need for clarifying legislation involved
a physician at the University of Nebraska hospital. Dr. Charles J. LaBenz was
charged with criminal violation of the state's abortion law following the live birth
after a saline abortion of a two-pound, nine-ounce boy of 26 weeks' gestational age
who lived nearly three hours. Dr. LaBenz had estimated the fetus to be 19 gestation-
al weeks old, thus allowing the abortion under the then applicable university policy
prohibiting nontherapeutic abortions after the 20th week. The University's Board
of Regents subsequently banned nontherapeutic abortions at the hospital. MFICAL
Woar.a NEws, Nov. 26, 1979, at 36-37.
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involve one of three methods: saline or prostaglandin instillation, or
hysterotomy.28
1. Saline or Prostaglandin Instillation
The most commonly used late abortion method in the United States
is hypertonic saline instillation, sometimes called saline amniocentesis or
"salting out." This method involves the use of a hollow needle, which is
inserted through the abdomen and the uterine wall and into the amniotic
sac. Some of the amniotic fluid is then withdrawn and an equal or greater
amount of saline solution is injected in its place.29 The fetus dies of acute
salt poisoning,30 usually within one and one-half hours. Labor begins,
usually within twenty-four hours, and continues until the fetus is expelled,
thirty-six to seventy-two hours after the saline was injected.3 1 Reports of
live births following saline instillation are extremely rare.32
Prostaglandin instillation is similar to saline instillation, except that
instead of the saline solution, a chemical compound causing muscular
contractions is injected into the amniotic sac.3 3 "In contrast to hypertonic
saline, prostaglandin is not directly lethal to the fetus. The occasional
delivery of a fetus with a heartbeat suggests that fetal death usually occurs
close to the time of abortion, probably secondary to anoxia [deprivation
of oxygen] during labor."3 4 Thus, the chances of fetal survival following
prostaglandin abortion are greater than the chances of fetal survival
following saline abortion. 35 In fact, "many fetuses show signs of life at
expulsion but die shortly thereafter."36
Saline and prostaglandin abortion both involve possible complications
including hemorrhage, infection, uterine fundal and cervical rupture, and
retained products of conception.37 Saline abortion patients also risk
cardiovascular effects, coagulation disorders, tissue damage, and hyper-
natremia (a potentially life-threatening increase in the amount of sodium
in the blood),38 if the physician inadvertantly introduces the saline solution
28. C. TiEE, INDUCED ABORTION: 1979, at 70-71 (3d ed. 1979).
29. Id. at 68.
80. Galen, Chauhan, Wietzner & Nauvarro, Fetal Pathology and Mechanism
of Fetal Death in Saline-Induced Abortion, 120 Am. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY
347, 347 (1974).
31. C. TIErzE, supra note 28, at 68.
32. GEo. WAsH. U. MED. CENTER: DEP'T OF MED. & PUB. AFF., SERIES F,
POPULATION REP. 68 (Sept. 1976).
3. C. TiETzE, supra note 28, at 68-69.
34. Globus & Erickson, Mid-Trimester Abortion Induced by Intra-Amniotic
Prostaglandin F2a: Fetal Tissue Viability, 119 Am. J. OBsTET s & GYNECOLOGY
268, 268 (1974).
35. Stroh ge Hinman, Reported Live Births Following Indu~ed Abortion: Two
and One-half Years' Experience in Upstate New York, 126 Am. J. OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 83, 83, (1976). I
36. C. TIEYZE, supra note'28, at 69.
37. Brenner, The Cuirent Status of Prostaglandins as Abortifacients, 123 Ams.
J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY '306, 319-20 (1975).
38. GEo. WASH. U. MED. CENTER: DEP'T OF MED. & PUB. AFF., SERIES F, Popu-
LATION REP. 70 (Sept. 1976).
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into the patient's vascular system. 9 Prostaglandin abortion patients often
experience vomiting and some diarrhea, though these side effects are
controllable with medication. Rare, potentially serious complications of
prostaglandin instillation are bronchospasm (constriction of air passages
in the lungs), cardiovascular changes, and grand mal seizure, usually due to
inadvertant systemic (rather than intra-amniotic) administration. 40 Inad-
vertant intravascular injection of prostaglandins is less dangerous than
inadvertant intravascular injection of saline.4
The relative merits of the prostaglandin and saline techniques have
been debated in the medical literature. Although prostaglandin results
in a shorter induction-to-abortion time and involves no danger of the
coagulopathy, hypernatremia, and tissue damage associated with saline,
repeat procedures are more frequently necessary, and heavy uterine bleeding
requiring a transfusion or surgical evacuation of the uterus is more common
in prostaglandin abortion.42 One study found higher rates of fever, endo-
metritis, hemorrhage, retained products of conception, and convulsions in
prostaglandin patients when compared to saline patients. The authors
noted possible explanations for the differences as inexperience with the
prostaglandin technique and selection of sub-optimal dosage schedules.43
Most of the literature appears to support the contention that prostaglandin
abortion is safer than saline abortion.44
Possible psychological complications of the two instillation methods
are similar. While any abortion may precipitate a psychological crisis in
a susceptible individual, the most common psychological reaction to abor-
tion is a feeling of relief. 45 The instillation methods may involve more
complex psychological reactions, however, because a saline or prostaglandin
abortion patient may not be attended by her physician when the fetus is
39. Brenner, supra note 37, at 320.
40. Id. at 319.
41. Dillon, Phillips, Risk, Horiguchi, Mohajer-Shojai & Mootabar, The Ef-ficacy of Prostaglandin F2a in Second-Trimester Abortion, 118 AM. J. OBsmrmics
& GYNECOLOGY 688, 696-97 (1974).
42. C. TiETZE, supra note 28, at 69, 80-81.
43. Grimes, Schulz, Cates & Tyler, Midtrimester Abortion by Intraarnniotic
Prostaglandin g2a Safer Than Saline?, 19 OBSTMuCS & GYNECOLOGY 612, 614-15
(1977).
44. One comprehensive study noted five reasons why prostaglandins may be
safer than saline: fewer cardiovascular effects, no coagulation problems, no sodium
load, no hypernatremia, and no tissue damage due to inappropriate administration.
Disadvantages of prostaglandin listed in the same study are the more frequent ne-
cessity of repeat procedures, higher rates of gastrointestinal side effects, higher costs(which may be offset by briefer hospitalization), and higher incidence of cervi-
covaginal fistulas. Brenner, supra note 37, at 320-21, 323; Edelman, Brenner,
Mehta, Philips, Bhatt & Bhivandiwala, A Comparative Study of Intra-Amniotic
Saline and Two Prostaglandin F2a Dose Schedules for Midterm Abortion,
125 Ar. J. Onsrmics & GYNECOLOGY 188, 194 (1976); Fraser & Brash, Comparison
of Extra- and Intra-Amniotic Prostaglandins for Therapeutic Abortion, 43 OBs=zr-
Rucs & GYNECOLOGY 97, 101 (1974).
45. C. TimEZE, supra note 28, at 77-78.
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delivered, usually in the patient's hospital bed.4 6 One study of prostagland-
in abortion patients noted that, because the procedure is really an induction
of labor, the patient had "a long and painful experience. . . .Anger at
the attending physician for being unavailable was prominent. '47
In summary, the instillation methods involve the injection into the
amniotic sac of a strong saline solution or a chemical that stimulates
muscular contractions. Both methods cause the pregnant woman to go
into labor and deliver the fetus. The prostaglandin method is more likely
to result in fetal survival than is the saline method. Both methods involve
a risk of physical complications, but the prostaglandin method may be
safer than the saline method. The risk of psychological complications
resulting from the two techniques is similar, with problems possibly related
to the usual absence of the attending physician when the fetus is delivered.
2. Hysterotomy
Hysterotomy is similar to caesarean section, except the fetus is assumed
to be nonviable. Hysterotomy is rarely used unless other methods fail be-
cause it is considered major surgery and involves more risk of complications
to the pregnant woman.48 As with prostaglandin instillation,49 the hyster-
otomy procedure is not directly lethal to the fetus. Rather, the fetus is born
alive and dies shortly thereafter due to its inability to survive outside the
uterus. As alleged in the case of Dr. Edelin,5 0 however, the obstetrician
may deprive the fetus of oxygen and wait for it to die before removing it
from the uterus. The possible complications of hysterotomy are similar
to those for any major abdominal surgery, including hemorrhage, infection,
fever, and the risks associated with general anesthesia. 51 In addition, many
46. See M. DxENs, IN NEc~ssrry AND SoRRow 58 (1976); UTAH WoMEN's
CLINIC, FAcTs ABoUT PREGNANCY 10 (n.d.).
47. Kaltreider, Goldsmith Se Margolis, The Impact of Midtrimester Abortion
Techniques on Patients and Staff, 135 AM. J. OBsTTucs & GYNECOLOGY 235, 236
(1979). A similar reaction was expressed by the nurses caring for the prostaglandin
patients:
On the gynecology hospital floor amnio [i.e., instillation method] abor-
tions are viewed by the nurses as the most upsetting experiences which
occur and a symbol of abandonment by the medical staff. The ward
nurses' comments speak dearly to the point of being left to cope with an
upset patient who delivers late at night. The house staff, although tech-
nically available, made clear their preference to be in the delivery room
where "live births" occur.
Id. Because the attitudes of the nurses and other professionals involved may be
closely associated with the level of emotional stress experienced by abortion patients,
C. TiE-rz, supra note 28, at 78, the saline or prostaglandin patient may be ex-
posed to a higher risk of psychological complications, due to the adverse effects of
the attending physician's absence, than are patients aborted by other tech-
niques.
48. C. T'ZE, supra note 28, at 78.
49. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
50. 371 Mass. at 502-03, 359 N.E.2d at 7. See H. BROWN, DATH BoRE
BITHu 104-05 (1977).
51. See C. TimEz, supra note 28, at 69.
1980]
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physicians believe that future abortions or deliveries experienced by
hysterotomy patients must be effected by hysterotomy or caesarean section,
because of the danger that the abortion-related scar will rupture during
labor.52
Psychological complications of hysterotomy may be less frequent than
those experienced with the instillation methods. Because the hysterotomy
patient receives general anesthesia, she may be able to avoid the potentially
disturbing reality of the abortion choice, and any attendant psychological
problems. 53
In order to understand recent Supreme Court pronouncements on
abortion after viability, it is important to note the differences between
the three common late abortion methods, the risks to the woman, and the
impact on the fetus. Hysterotomy and prostaglandin instillation are more
likely to result in the delivery of a live fetus than is saline instillation.
Hysterotomy is more physically dangerous to the pregnant woman than
are the instillation methods, but may involve fewer psychological risks.
Prostaglandin abortion is likely to be safer for the pregnant woman than
saline abortion. It must be emphasized that all of these methods involve
some degree of danger to the pregnant woman. As one physician wrote,
"Few risks in obstetrics are more certain than that which occurs to a
... [woman] undergoing abortion after the 14th week of pregnancy." 54
B. The United States Supreme Court's
Rulings on Late Abortion
Under the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade,55 states have
the option to regulate post-viability abortions. In that decision, the Supreme
Court was confronted with the constitutionality of the Texas criminal
abortion laws which prohibited abortion except when necessary to save
the woman's life. 56 The Supreme Court maintained that a woman's right
of privacy encompassed the decision whether or not to have an abortion,
although this right was not absolute.5 7 The Court divided pregnancy into
trimesters and delineated appropriate state regulation of abortion during
each period. The Court in Roe held that, in the first trimester, the abortion
52. Id.
53. One study comparing dilatation and extraction (D & E) patients, who,
like hysterotomy patients, underwent general anesthesia, with prostaglandin pa-
tients reported that the D 8 E patients felt the abortion went smoothly and that
the general anesthesia made the experience-seem unreal. The D & E patiehts were
able to avoid the stark details of the procedure and experienced less depression,
anger, and guilt than the prostaglandin patients, who experienced more pain and
described the abortion as being like labor or the loss of a child. Kaltreider, Gold
smith & Margolis, supra note 47, at 236.
54. Duenhoelter & Gant, Complications Following Prostaglandin F2&-Induced
Midtrimester Abortion, 46 OBstnrucs & GYNECOLOGY 247, 250 (1975).
55. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
56. Id. at 117 n.l.
57. Id. at 153.
[Vol. 45
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decision and its effectuation must be left to the pregnant woman and her
attending physician. In the second trimester, the state's interest in maternal
health is sufficiently compelling to allow the state to regulate abortion in
ways reasonably related to maternal health, but the state cannot prohibit
abortion altogether. When the fetus attains viability, the state may regulate
or prohibit abortion except when it is necessary to preserve the life or
health of the pregnant woman. Viability was designated as the point at
which the state's interest in potential life becomes compelling.58 The only
available constitutional protection of the fetus' life'in the abortion context
stems from that compelling state interest. The interest of the fetus in its
own life, if such an interest exists, was not considered worthy of legal pro-
tection, as the fetus is not a "person" within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment. 59
Because any state attempt to regulate late abortions in order to protect
the state's interest in potential life must wait until the fetus attains viability,
the definition of viability is crucial. In Roe v. Wade the observation that
the medical and scientific communities consider a fetus to be viable if it
is "potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial
aid," 60 was further defined to include the "capability of meaningful life."0 1
The Court pointed out that viability is "usually placed at about seven
months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks." 62 The medical
nature of the judgment of viability and the necessity of leaving that point
flexible, as a matter for the judgment of the physician on a case-by-case
basis, were emphasized in Doe v. Bolton,63 and reaffirmed in Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth.64 The Danforth Court upheld a definition of
viability as "that stage of fetal development when the life of the unborn
child may be continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or arti-
ficial life-supportive systems." 65 The Court noted that its definition of
viability in Roe v. Wade was purposely left flexible for "professional
determination dependent upon developing medical skill and technical
ability."6 6
In summary, the Supreme Court has found a state interest in potential
life which rises to the level of a compelling state interest when the fetus
attains viability. Viability is defined in terms of potential ability to live
outside the womb and' is a flexible concept calling for a case-by-case
determination by the physician.
58. Id. at 164-65.
59. Id. at 158:
60. Id. at 160.
61. Id. at 163..
62. Id. at 160.
63. 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973).
64. 428 U.S. 52, 64-65 (1976).
65. Id. at 63-65. -
66. Id. at 64.
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C. Pennsylvania's Attempt to Regulate
Late Abortions
One state's attempt to regulate late abortions was recently invalidated
by the Supreme Court in Colautti v. Franklin.6 7 Section 5(a) of the Penn-
sylvania Abortion Control Act required every person performing an
abortion to determine that the fetus was not viable. If the fetus was
viable, or if there was sufficient reason to believe the fetus might be
viable, the Act required the abortionist to exercise the same degree of
professional care to preserve the life of the fetus as would be exercised if
the fetus was intended to be born rather than aborted. The Act also re-
quired that the abortion technique used be one which would provide the
best opportunity for the fetus to be aborted alive, so long as a different
technique was not necessary to preserve the life or health of the pregnant
woman.68 A three-judge district court declared section 5(a) to be un-
constitutionally vague and overbroad, and enjoined its enforcement.6 9 The
United States Supreme Court affirmed. The Pennsylvania statute was
considered faulty in two major respects: first, in failing to describe pre-
cisely when the statutory standard of care was required; second, in failing
to define precisely the parameters of the standard of care.70
The Colautti Court further clarified the definition of viability:
Viability is reached when, in the judgment of the attending
physician on the particular facts of the case before him, there is
a reasonable likelihood of the fetus' sustained survival outside the
womb, with or without artificial support. Because this point may
differ with each pregnancy, neither the legislature nor the courts
may proclaim one of the elements entering into the ascertainment
of viability-be it weeks of gestation or fetal weight or any other
single factor-as the determinant of when the State has a compel-
ling interest in the life or health of the fetus.71
Pennsylvania's definition of viability was vague in two respects. First, the
Court feared that the statutory standard for finding that a fetus "may be
viable" might rest on an objective standard or a mixed subjective/objective
standard.7 2 Such confusion and ambiguity were considered impermissibly
vague.73 In addition, the "may be viable" condition was considered proble-
matic in itself. Since the constitutionally acceptable definition of viability,
that is, "potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with
67. 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
68. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6605 (Pardon 1977).
69. Planned Parenthood v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Pa. 1975). The
three-judge court assumed jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970), which was
later repealed by Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, § 1, 90 Stat. 1119.
The repeal was not applicable to actions commenced on or before August 12, 1976.
439 U.S. at 381 n.2.
70. 439 U.S. at 390-94, 397-401.
71. Id. at 388-89.
72, See 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6605(a) (Pardon 1977).
73. 439 U.S. at 391, 394-95.
[Vol. 45
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artificial aid," 74 already included the notion of reasonable potential ability
to live,75 the words "may be viable" were considered ambiguous. The Court
concluded that either "viable" or "may be viable," as used in the statute,
differed in some way from the constitutionally accepted notion of viability,
and thus the statute was impermissibly vague.78 The statute failed to
"afford broad discretion to the physician" due to the ambiguity of the
criteria used to define viability.77
The vagueness associated with the definition of viability in the Penn-
sylvania statute was exacerbated because no element of culpability or
scienter was required in connection with the viability determination.7 8
The Court pointed out that the "constitutionality of a vague statutory
standard is closely related to whether that standard incorporates a require-
ment of mens rea."7 9 Although the Court did not hold that civil or criminal
liability for an erroneous determination of viability must be predicated
on scienter, the Court did hint that the subjective, individualized nature
of the viability determination may be inconsistent with the imposition of
strict liability in any case:
[I]t is not unlikely that experts will disagree whether a particular
fetus in the second trimester has advanced to the stage of viability.
The prospect of such disagreement, in conjunction with the
statute imposing strict civil and criminal liability for an erroneous
determination of viability, could have a profound chilling effect
on the willingness of physicians to perform abortions near the
point of viability in the manner indicated by their best medical
judgment.8 0
In summary, the "may be viable" language was faulty because the
standard on which the determination was based was ambiguous, and the
"may be viable" phrase injected an element of uncertainty as to whether
the concept of viability was being expanded beyond constitutional limits.8 1
The vagueness problems were compounded by the statute's failure to in-
corporate an element of scienter prior to the imposition of liability for an
erroneous determination of nonviability.8 2
The Pennsylvania statutory standard of care provision was also declared
impermissibly vague by the Colautti Court because it failed to delineate
the parameters of the standard of care. The standard involved two re-
quirements. The first required the physician to exercise that degree of
professional skill, care, and diligence to preserve the life and health of the
fetus as would be exercised if the fetus were intended to be born alive and
74. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 160.
75. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. at 388-89.
76. Id. at 391-94.
77. Id. at 393-94.
78. Id. at 394.
79. Id. at 395.
80. Id. at 396.
81. Id. at 391-94.
82. Id. at 394.
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not aborted. The second part of the standard required the physician to
use the abortion technique which would provide the best opportunity for
the fetus to be aborted alive so long as a different technique would not be
necessary to preserve the life or health of the pregnant woman.
In focusing on the second part of the standard,83 the Court's main
concern was that the statute did not expressly state that the woman's life
and health must prevail over that of the fetus if the two conflict. The Court
perceived ambiguity in the provision that a different technique must be
"necessary" to the woman's life or health. The Court believed that this
lhnguage suggested that the technique must be indispensable rather than
"merely desirable." In addition, the phrase "life or health of the mother"
did not necessarily allow the physician to consider "all factors relevant to
the welfare of the woman."8 4 The vagueness of the standard of care pro-
vision, like that of the definition of viability, was aggravated by the lack
of a scienter requirement.8 5
Mr. Justice White, joined in dissent by the Chief Justice and Mr.
Justice Rehnquist, criticized the majority for narrowing the permissible
scope of state power to regulate abortion after viability.8 6 The dissent
argued that the Pennsylvania statute, through the use of the "may be
viable" phrase, was not enlarging the period of abortion regulation to
further the state's interest in the life of the fetus. Rather, the state was
merely attempting to protect the same potential for survival outside the
womb that the Court itself had incorporated in the definition of viability.8 7
Moreover, the dissent chided the majority for refusing to interpret the
standard of care as incorporating the scienter requirement of the Penn-
sylvania criminal homicide statute, and for refusing to abstain pending an
interpretation by the state court.8 8 Finally, the dissent argued that the
Court should not declare the standard of care provisions unconstitutional
in the first instance, since the complaint did not attack the standard of
care provisions of the Pennsylvania statute. The district court invalidated
the statute only on the basis of the definition of viability and did not
address the standard of care issue.8 9
D. Problems Posed by the Colautti Decision
The Court's decision in Colautti v. Franklin is not a simple invalida-
tion of a faulty state abortion statute. Rather, the Court arguably has
limited the states' ability to protect their interest in potential life, contrary
to the implications of Roe v. Wade.
One of the problems posed by Colautti stems from the Court's con-
83. Id. at 397.
84. Id. at 400.
85. Id. at 401.
86. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 406-07 (White, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 407-08 (White, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 408 (White, J., dissenting).
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tinued reliance on viability as the point at which the state's interest in
fetal life becomes a compelling justification for state regulation. This aspect
of Roe v. Wade and other pre-Colautti abortion cases has been criticized
elsewhere, 90 but the Colautti opinion further illustrates the difficulty of
converting a matter of medical judgment into a legislative standard. A
state attempting to protect its interest in potential life is faced with Su-
preme Court rulings that the determination of viability is a medical matter
left to the judgment of the attending physician. The Colautti decision
emphasizes the seemingly absolute role of the physician in the determina-
tion of fetal viability or nonviability.91 The Court's Willingness to leave
the determination of viability solely to the discretion of the attending
physician makes regulation of that discretion virtually impossible and
consequently makes it difficult for the state to vindicate its compelling
interest in the life of the fetus after viability. The doctor whose conduct
is to be regulated is the person who decides when the state's regulatory
interest comes into being.
The scant protection of state interest offered by the doctor's sub-
jective determination of viability is further eroded by the fact that the
physician's choice of abortion methods and conduct during the abortion
may affect or determine the viability of the fetus. 92 The physician's de-
termination of nonviability may become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The
testimony of the physicians in Colautti indicated that the choice of abortion
methods in late abortions does affect fetal survival.93 A fetus who would
be viable if the abortion were performed by hysterotomy or prostaglandin
amniocentesis might not be viable if the abortion were performed by saline
amniocentesis. Similarly, the rigors of labor and delivery after prostaglandin
instillation might affect the viability of a fetus who could survive a hys-
terotomy, where the fetus could be lifted out of the uterus and placed in
intensive care.
Fetal viability is affected not only by the choice of abortion methods,
but also by the conduct of the physician during abortion. Dr. Edelin's
actions were an extreme example. His deprivation of oxygen to a fetus for
three minutes allegedly insured its nonviability.94 In a less extreme case, a
fetus who might survive an induced premature birth, with the attention
of all involved parties focused on the life and good health of the mother
and the baby, might not survive the rigors of an abortion during which
the fetus' safety was ignored. Thus, the Supreme Court's reliance on the
90. E.g., H. BROWN, supra note 50, at 79-80; Destro, Abortion and the Con-
stitution: The Need for a Life-Protective Amendment, 63 CALIF. L. Rrv. 1250, 1311-
13 (1975); Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L.J. 920, 924-26 (1973); Horan, Viability, Values, and the Vast Cosmos, 22 CATH.
LAW. 1, 23-28 (1976).
91. 439 U.S. at 388, 391-92, 394-97, 400-01.
92. See notes 28-54 and accompanying text supra.
93. 439 U.S. at 398-400.
94. 371 Mass. at 506-07, 359 N.E.2d at 9.
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judgment of the attending physician, without any objective element added
to the viability determination,95 makes it more difficult for a state ade-
quately to indicate the time and circumstances under which the state's
interest is to be compelling and its regulations in effect.
Another problem involved in the Colautti decision results from the
Court's criticism of the language of the Pennsylvania statute, which re-
quired a standard of care when a fetus "is viable or there is substantial
reason to believe that the fetus may be viable."906 The Court believed that
the "may be viable" provision could carve out an area of state regulation
inconsistent with the Court's definition of viability, which already included
reasonable potential ability to live.07 This apparent insistence on almost
fanatic attention to detail by state legislators in drafting abortion regula-
tions is most troubling. The Court seems unwilling to give the states the
benefit of the doubt in interpreting abortion legislation, despite the
accepted rule of statutory construction that a state is entitled to a consti-
tutional interpretation of a statute if both constitutional and unconstitu-
tional interpretations are possible.98 Apparently there is no room for
states to develop language of their own; rather, legislatures are obliged to
quote from the Supreme Court's abortion opinions in order to phrase
statutes acceptably. 99 Such a requirement is especially ironic, as the Su-
preme Court is protecting a constitutional "right" derived by implication
and not from express constitutional language.100
The majority's fastidiousness was criticized by the dissent. Justice
White reiterated the Roe v. Wade definition of viability as "potentially
able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid."101 Thus,
he continued, the Supreme Court's definition of viability actually embraces
two periods, first, the period of actual ability to live outside the womb, and
second, the period of potential ability to live outside the womb. The state
of Pennsylvania could have defined viability in terms of potential ability
to live and could have regulated abortions after that stage in pregnancy.
Instead, Pennsylvania defined viability in terms of actual ability to live,
thus covering the first period contained in the Supreme Court's definition
of viability, and then regulated abortions when the fetus "is viable or there
95. 439 U.S. at 388-89.
96. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6605(a) (Purdon 1977).
97. 439 U.S. at 390-94.
98. United States v. Delaware 8c Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 407 (1909); L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 714 (1978). See also Ashwander v. TVA,
297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22,
62 (1932).
99. State legislators who adopt Supreme Court language, however, must do so
carefully. A federal district court recently held there was a reasonable likelihood
that the Illinois abortion statute's definition of viability was unconstitutional be-
cause it adopted Supreme Court language explaining what viability does not mean
in order to define what viability does mean. Charles v. Carey, 48- F. Supp.
- - (N.D. Ill. 1979).
100. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 152-53.
101. 439 U.S. at 401 (White, J., dissenting).
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is sufficient reason to believe the fetus may be viable,"102 thus including the
second period covered by the Supreme Court's definition of viability.10 3
Rather than giving the language this perfectly plausible reading, the Court
insisted that the "viable or... may be viable" language carved out a new
time period for state regulation. While the Court is consistent in holding
that a legislature may not enlarge the period in which the state may further
its compelling interest in potential life, the Court appears to be reaching
to find that the state was in fact attempting to enlarge the period of regu-
lation.1 04
Probably the most distressing and far-reaching implications of the
Colautti opinion stem from the invalidation of the standard of care pro-
vision. The Pennsylvania statute, in attempting to protect the state's
interest in potential life, did not unconstitutionally prohibit post-viability
abortions. The statute did, however, go beyond the mere prohibition of
non-necessary abortions to impose on the physician a duty of care toward
the fetus during the post-viability abortion. The statute, as discussed
above,' 05 attempted to describe the standard of care in two ways. The gen-
eral requirement that a physician "exercise that degree of professional skill,
care, and diligence to preserve the life and health of the fetus which such
person would be required to exercise in order to preserve the life and health
of any fetus intended to be born and not aborted" was not attacked in
Colautti.0 6
The Court criticized the second duty of care, which required that
the abortion technique be that "which would provide the best opportunity
for the fetus to be aborted alive so long as a different technique would not
be necessary in order to preserve the life or health of the mother."'10 The
majority contended that this provision did not specify that the woman's life
and health must always prevail over the fetus' life and health if they
conflict. Nor did the standard imply that all factors relevant to the health
of the woman would be taken into account by the physician in deciding
on the abortion technique1 0s
While it is true that doctors must have wide latitude for the exercise
of medical judgment in choosing an abortion technique that will be safest
for the pregnant woman, it can be argued that the Pennsylvania statute
provided just such latitude. By requiring the physician to use the abortion
method most likely to preserve the life of the fetus unless another method
was necessary to preserve the life or health of the woman, the statute
appeared to provide the physician with discretion to select the best pro-
cedure for the woman needing an abortion. The Supreme Court inexplicably
102. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6605(a) (Purdon 1977).
103. 439 U.S. at 402-03 (White, J., dissenting).
104. See id. at 406-07 (White, J., dissenting).
105. See notes 83-85 and accompanying text supra.
106. 439 U.S. at 397.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 400.
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argued that, in this context, the word necessary implied that a particular
technique must be indispensable to the woman's health and not "merely
desirable."' 0 9 In reaching that conclusion the Supreme Court gave great
weight to testimony that saline amniocentesis was generally the method
of choice for post-first trimester abortions and it was "commonly assumed"
that this procedure was prohibited by the Pennsylvania statute."10 It is
curious that the Court would attribute such relevance to this testimony
when the assumption is at variance with another, more plausible reading
of the statute, particularly in the absence of an authoritative interpretation
by the state supreme court. The language of the statute would not ban
saline amniocentesis, or any procedure, if it were the preferred method of
abortion for the sake of the woman's life or health. Moreover, the Court
emphasized the disadvantages of other abortion methods while ignoring
the substantial risks involved in saline amniocentesis. L ' Finally, the Court
failed to see one plausible explanation for the popularity of saline amnio-
centesis; it generally results in the delivery of a dead fetus,"12 thus saving
the physician and the woman the inconvenience and emotional stress of
a live birth."18
109. Id. The Court rejected similar quibbling over the meaning of necessary
in Doe v. Bolton. The Georgia statute challenged in that decision made abortion
criminal unless "based upon [the physician's] best clinical judgment that an abor-
tion is necessary." 410 U.S. at 191. That statute was saved from vagueness because
the physician's judgment would be exercised in the light of all attendant circum-
stances, including the psychological and physical well-being of the pregnant wo-
man. Id. at 191-92. The Pennsylvania statute invalidated in Colautti was arguably
susceptible of a similar broad interpretation as it also required the exercise of pro-
fessional skill. 35 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 6605(a) (Purdon 1977). The Court dis-
tinguished the Pennsylvania statute from the Georgia statute, saying the former
was doubly ambiguous and had not been interpreted broadly as had the statutes
discussed in Doe v. Bolton. 439 U.S. at 393-94. The Colautti majority neglected to
mention that neither the district court nor the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had
had the opportunity to interpret the standard of care provision. See note 89
and accompanying text supra.
110. 439 U.S. at 398.
111. Id. at 399. The Court listed several "undesirable side effects" associated
with prostaglandins, while ignoring those associated with saline. See notes 36-44 and
accompanying text supra. The Court also indicated that prostaglandin abortion
may be "unsafe" for patients with histories of asthma, glaucoma, hypertension,
cardiovascular disease, or epilepsy, while neglecting to mention that saline abortion
may be unsafe for patients with histories of sickle cell anemia, other moderate or
severe anemia, cardiovascular disease, or renal disorders. Gro. WASH. U. MFm.
CENTER: DEP'T OF MEm. & PUB. AFF., SERIES F, POPULATION REP. 70 (Sept. 1976).
112. 439 U.S. at 398. See notes 29-32 and accompanying text supra.
113. The idea that a physician may choose an abortion method more physically
dangerous or psychologically disconcerting to the pregnant woman for the sake of
the physician's own psychological comfort is not farfetched. One study comparing
dilatation and extraction (D & E) with "amnio" (i.e., instillation method) mid-
trimester abortion patients concluded that, although "the D and E technique is
safer, less painful, quicker, more convenient, and less expensive than amnio meth-
ods," physicians were slow in adopting the D & E method during midtrimester due
to "the psychological problems raised [for the physician] by the fetal dismember-
ment in the procedure." Kaltreider, Goldsmith & Margolis, supra note 47, at 237.
Similarly, physicians may be reluctant to adopt the prostaglandin technique,
[Vol. 45
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A live birth resulting from an abortion can be problematic for the
mother and the doctor. For this reason the standard of care provision
criticized by the Court can be described as Pennsylvania's attempt to insure
that a woman's right to decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy
is not expanded to include an absolute right to terminate the life of the
fetus. The standard also attempted to define the doctor's role by making
it clear that the doctor is not in an adversary relation to the fetus, and
that a termination of a pregnancy after viability does not require the
termination of fetal life. It may be assumed that some women who seek
abortions after viability do not want the unborn child. The survival of
an unwanted child following abortion is undoubtedly an emotional and
psychological burden for the woman involved and, to a lesser extent, for
her physician and the other medical personnel caring for her. The Supreme
Court has defined health in some contexts to include "all factors-physical,
emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's age-relevant to the
well-being of the patient." 114 The Court has also listed other "factors the
woman and her responsible physician necessarily will consider":
Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early
pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring,
may force upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psycho-
logical harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may
be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned,
associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of
bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and
otherwise, to care for it. In other cases.... the additional difficult-
ies and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be in-
volved."X5
If the post-viability abortion is performed because it is "necessary" to avoid
the burdens that pregnancy, childbirth, and motherhood would place
on a woman's emotional and psychological health, could not her doctor
assume that it would be better if a method were chosen and every step
taken during the abortion itself to insure that the fetus did not survive?" 6
though it could be safer than saline for a particular patient, because of the
psychological stress of coping with the possible delivery of a live fetus.
114. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 192. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. at 400.
115. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153.
116. One commentator discussed a similar result based solely on Roe v. Wade
and Doe v. Bolton:
[I]t can be argued that Roe bars the state from restricting the physician's
option to deliberately destroy the viable fetus. The Court explicitly ex-
cepted from the range of permissible state regulation those abortions
necessary to preserve the woman's health; no mention is made of a quali-
fication or condition on that exception. Furthermore, those very health
considerations that justify the abortion decision may also entail the de-
struction of the fetus; for example, a woman's psychological health might
be impaired unless she were assured that the fetus was dead .... Never-
theless, it may be troubling to read Roe as allowing the deliberate de-
struction of a viable fetus when there is a possibility of removing it alive
without increased danger to the mother.
Comment, Medical Responsibility for Fetal Survival Under Roe and Doe, 10
Hi tv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 444, 465 (1975).
1980]
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The prospect of a physician or a pregnant woman choosing a method
of abortion more likely to kill the fetus, or of a physician taking steps
during the abortion to insure the death of the fetus, for the sake of the
woman's psychological and emotional comfort, seems to reduce the state's
interest in potential life to meaningless proportions. Under such circum-
stances, the Supreme Court's invitation to states to regulate abortions
after viability except when the abortion is necessary to preserve the life
or health of a pregnant woman becomes a matter of the "life and health"
exception swallowing the "compelling state interest" rule. Yet, the Court's
decision in Colautti that the woman's health must prevail over the life and
health of the fetus, augmented by the Court's broad definition of health, 117
would appear to lend support to such a result.
A different, narrower definition of health in the context of choosing
abortion methods and of the physician's duty of care to the fetus would
raise the state's interest in potential life above the level of exhortation and
powerless concern. By the time a fetus attains viability, the pregnant woman
has already had a considerable amount of time in which to consider the
broader, more convenience-oriented aspects of the Court's definition of
health. Such a broad definition applied to post-viability abortions would
make regulation in this area ineffectual, particularly if a threat to "health"
includes the inconvenience caused by an unwanted child. Hopefully, the
Supreme Court will see the necessity of a narrower definition of health
after viability in order to give some meaning to the states' compelling
interest in potential life.
In summary, the Colautti decision is problematic in its reliance on
the viability standard and on the physician's judgment in determining
viability. The Court's refusal to give an available constitutional interpre-
tation to the Pennsylvania statute is troubling. Finally, the invalidation
of the standard of care provision, in conjunction with the Court's broad
definition of health, seems to inhibit meaningful advancement of a state's
compelling interest in potential life.
III. THE EFFECT OF THE Colautti
DECISION ON CURRENT STATE STATUTES
The decision of the Supreme Court in Colautti v. Franklin has far-
reaching effects on current state regulation of late abortions. Many state
statutes regulating post-viability abortions may be rendered unconstitution-
al by Colautti.
A survey of current state abortion statutes indicates that twenty-eight
states and the District of Columbia have failed to respond to the Supreme
Court's invitation to prohibit abortion after viability except where neces-
117. See note 114 and accompanying text supra.
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sary to the life or health of the pregnant woman. I s There are several
possible reasons for the lack of state action in this area. First, some states
may feel that the problem of late abortion is insignificant. Only two or
three percent of abortions performed in the United -States in 1976 were
performed during or after the twenty-first week of pregnancy, and the
percentage of late abortions has diminished every year since 1972.11
Nevertheless, two or three percent of more than one million abortions120
amounts to a significant number of potential lives worthy of state protec-
tion. In addition, there may be abortions performed before the twenty-first
week of pregnancy in which the fetus is viable, 121 increasing the number
of potential lives in which the state has a compelling interest.
Second, some states may be willing to rely on the judgment of physi-
cians involved in late abortions. Many physicians will refuse to perform
an abortion after the twentieth week of pregnancy unless the abortion is
medically necessary. Nonetheless, there are enough doctors who are willing
to perform late abortions, as indicated by the above statistics,122 to justify
state regulation aimed at protecting the state's interest in the potential
life of the fetus.
Third, some state legislators may believe the Supreme Court's abortion
decisions are improper and they do not wish to respond with conforming
legislation. This idea is reinforced by language in statutes passed by the
Illinois and Nebraska legislatures. The Illinois statute declares the Court's
abortion decisions to be inconsistent with the state's longstanding policy
that the unborn child is a human- being, and provides that the state's
former abortion statute, prohibiting abortions unless they are necessary
to preserve the mother's life, will automatically come into effect should
the Court reverse or modify its decisions or should a prolife constitutional
amendment be enacted. 12 3 The Nebraska statute characterizes the Supreme
Court's abortion decisions as a "legislative intrusion" and expresses the
policy that the people of Nebraska desire to provide protection to the
unborn child whenever possible.' 24
Finally, many state legislators, may be confused as to constitutional
118.* The 'states that have enacted such a prohibition are Florida, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts (prohibition after 24
weeks), Minnesota ("potentially viable"), Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada
(prohibition after 24 weeks), New York (prohibition after 24 weeks, life only),
North Carolina (prohibition after 20 weeks), North Dakota, Oklahoma, Penn-
sylvania, South Dakota (prohibition after 24 weeks), Tennessee, Utah, and Wyom-
ng.
119. C. TimrzE, supra note 28, at 62, Figure 5.
120. Id. at 35, Table 2.
121. Horan, supra note 90, at 24-28. See Hack, Fanaroff & Merkatz, The Low-
Birth-Weight Infant-Evolution of a Changing Outlook, 301 NEw ENGLAND J. MED.
1162 (1979); ,Horan, Abortion and the Conscience Clause: Current Status, 20
CATH. LAw. 289, 297-302 (1974).
122. See notes 119 & 120 and accompanying text supra.
123. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-21 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979).
124. NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-325(1) (1978).
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requirements relating to the regulation of post-viability abortions, or may
believe that the effort to effectively regulate late abortions is futile. The
following survey of existing state statutes indicates that the legislative task
is indeed difficult in this area, where the Supreme Court has defined the
state's interest so narrowly and appears to be narrowing the definition
further each time it reviews a state's abortion statute. The discussion below
involves only those statutes defining viability and regulating post-viability
or late abortions, and includes the Pennsylvania statute invalidated in
Colautti as well as some other statutes with obviously or arguably uncon-
stitutional provisions. The survey delineates five provisions included in
current state abortion statutes, discussing each one in the light of the
Colautti decision, and suggesting an approach to each area of regulation.
A. The Definition of Viability
The Colautti Court defined viability as the point at which there is a
reasonable likelihood of the fetus' sustained survival outside the womb,,
with or without artificial support, and emphasized that the concept is
not constitutionally susceptible to a broader or narrower interpretation. 125
The importance of including potential, and not just actual, ability to live
in the definition of viability was significant in the Supreme Court's per
curiam opinion in Anders v. Floyd.126
Current state statutes that define viability do so in four ways. Idaho
and Utah basically quote the Supreme Court's statement in Roe v. Wade
that the viable fetus is "potentially able to live outside the mother's womb,
albeit with artificial aid."' 2 7 Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, and Ne-
braska all follow the Danforth definition of viability as "that stage of fetal
development when the life of the unborn child may be continued indef-
initely outside the womb by natural or artificial life supportive systems.' 28
Indiana, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
and Wyoming define viability in terms of actual ability to live,' 29 an
unrealistic definition given the current inability of doctors to determine
viability with any certainty before performing an abortion. A definition
of viability, excluding potential ability to live, may also be unacceptable
to the Supreme Court, as implied in the Court's per curiam opinion in
Anders v. Floyd.130
125. 439 U.S. at 388-89.
126. 440 U.S. at 445.
127. IDAHO CODE § 18-604 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-302 (1978).
128. IOWA CODE § 702.20 (Special Pamphlet 1979); Ky. REv. STAT. § 311.720(5)
(1978); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1598 (1964); RSMo § 188.015 (1978); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 28-326(7) (1978).
129. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-1(e) (Burns 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.41
(West Supp. 1979); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 50-20-104(5) (1978); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-02.1-02 (Interim Supp. 1979); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6602 (Purdon
1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-302(3) (Supp. 1979); Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-101(vii)
(1977).
130. 440 U.S. at 445.
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Oklahoma and Louisiana have somewhat unique provisions defining
viability. Although both states follow the Roe/Doe definition of viability
as "potentially able to live outside the womb," they characterize the
potential ability as relating to premature birth.131 In Louisiana and Okla-
homa, a fetus with a reasonable chance of surviving a premature birth, but
with small likelihood of surviving an abortion, would be considered viable
for purposes of state regulation of post-viability abortions. Such a defini-
tion, in effect, prohibits the physician from determining viability based
upon the method contemplated to terminate the pregnancy.
A constitutional and effective definition of viability would probably
include language very similar to the definitions of viability set forth in the
Rae, Danforth, and Colautti opinions. Further protection of a state's post-
viability interest in potential life would result if a statement similar to
the provisions in the Louisiana and Oklahoma statutes were included. It is
crucial that a state's definition of viability conform to the Supreme Court's
definitions without any express or implied intent to broaden or narrow
the scope of viability for purposes of regulating late abortion. A statute
might define viability as follows:
Viability is reached when, in the judgment of the attending physi-
cian on the particular facts of the case, the fetus is potentially
able to live outside the womb, or there is reasonable likelihood
of the fetus' sustained survival outside the womb, with or without
artificial aid. Viability shall be determined on the fetus' ability
to survive premature birth, whether by natural causes, induced
labor, or induced abortion.
The Colautti Court stated that a legislature may not proclaim any
single element of the viability determination as the trigger of the state's
interest in the potential life of the fetus. 1 32 A state wishing to give some
direction to the physician's judgment, however, might include a list of
factors to be considered in making the viability determination:
Although the point of viability may differ with each pregnancy,
the physician should consider such factors as fetal weight, gesta-
tional age, the measurement of the fundus, the presence and
strength of fetal heart tones, the pregnant woman's report of the
date of her last menstrual period, her health and nutritional
status, and the availability of neonatal life-support equipment
and personnel in determining viability.
A similar method of giving direction to the physician's viability
determination is suggested by provisions in five state statutes creating a
presumption for or against viability at a certain stage in pregnancy. The
Idaho statute creates an irrebuttable presumption that a fetus is not viable
until the twenty-fifth week of pregnancy. 3 3 Similarly, South Carolina
131. LA. R.v. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.1(3) (West Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 63, § 1-730 (West Supp. 1978-1979).
132. 439 U.S. at 388-89.
133. IDAHO CoDE § 18-604 (1979).
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presumes a fetus is not viable until the twenty-fourth week.13 4 Oklahoma
and Louisiana presume a fetus is viable after twenty-four weeks, 135 and
Minnesota, which defines viability as actual ability to live, presumes a
fetus is potentially viable during the second half of its gestation (approxi-
mately twenty weeks).1'3 Tennessee also defines viability in actual terms,
and requires a doctor to inform a pregnant woman seeking an abortion that
after twenty-four weeks the fetus may be viable.13 7
A statutorily prescribed presumption of viability would be unconsti-
tutional if its only effect were to cause the automatic application of post-
viability regulations to any abortion involving a fetus who met the pre-
sumption. Similarly, a presumption of nonviability based on the single
factor of estimated gestational age would be unconstitutional if it
automatically precluded the attending physician from determining that
such a fetus is viable. Both presumptions would deprive the attending
physician of the opportunity to ascertain viability in accordance with his
or her best medical judgment. A presumption may be allowed, however, if
it requires a physician only to rebut it in a manner similar to that described
in the following language:
Any fetus who, in the judgment of the attending physician, has
attained the age of twenty weeks' gestation, is presumed viable.
A physician planning to abort a fetus presumed viable must con-
form to all [state] laws and- regulations of post-viability abortion
unless he or she certifies in good faith that, despite the presump-
tion, the fetus is not viable, and gives the reasons for the determi-
nation of non-viability. The certificate shall become a part of the
patient's medical record as described under [the statutory record-
keeping provision].
An additional measure that could be employed to protect the state's
interest in potential life after viability would be a requirement that the
attending physician use ultrasonography' 38 to aid in the viability determi-
nation after the fetus is presumed viable.
B. The Prohibition of Post-Viability' Abortions
A state desiring to protect its interest in the potential life of a viable
fetus should accept the Supreme Court's invitation to prohibit any post-
134. S.C. CODE § 4441-10(1) (1976).
135. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.4 (West Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 63, § 1-732 (West Supp. 1978-1979).
136. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.411 (West Supp. 1979). The definition of viability
and the presumption of viability created by the Minnesota statute were held un-
constitutional in Hodgson v. Lawson, 542 F.2d 1350, 1354 (8th Cir. 1976).
137. TENN. CODE ANN. § 89-02 (Supp. 1979).
138. Ultrasonography involves the use of high-frequency sound waves to eval-
uate the size and position of a structure within the body, allowing the creation of
a two-dimensional "picture" of the structure. The diagnostic use of ultrasound is
much less hazardous than exposure to X-rays, and allows more accurate estimation
of gestational age than do other means. OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 493-97, 507-11(3d ed. D. Danforth 1977).
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viabilityA;ibortion unless it is necessary to preserve the life or health of
the pregnant woman. Seventeen states presently conform to that stand-
ard.'8 9 Massachusetts, Nevada, and South Dakota impose the same prohi-
bition at twenty-four weeks, and North Carolina imposes the prohibition
after twenty weeks.' 40 In New York, abortions are prohibited after twenty-
four weeks unless necessary to save the woman's life.1 41
In many states, the exception to the prohibition of post-viability
aboitions is allowed only to prevent death or "permanent impairment,"
"imminent peril," "severe and long-lasting," or other variously described
threats to the woman's health. 42 The constitutionality of such descriptions
is questionable, as they appear to require something more than the
necessary preservation of health. An acceptable statute would probably
include a simple statement paralleling the Supreme Court's language that
post-viability abortions may be prohibited unless they are "necessary in
appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health
of the mother."' 43 Any state attempt to begin the prohibition at a point
other than viability-at certain number of weeks, for example-would be
unconstitutional. 4 4
It is difficult to determine whether an 'abortion statute should define
health broadly, 'to include "all factors relevant to the welfare of the
woman,"' 45 in the context of the prohibition of post-viability abortions
unri~cessary to the pregnant woman's life or health. As discussed earlier, 46
a broad definition of health in the post-viability context undermines such
a prohibition and effectively establishes "abortion on demand" at all
139. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.225 (West Supp. 1979); ILL. ANN. ST]AT. ch. 38,
§ 81-25 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-2 (Burns 1979); IoWA
CODE § .707.7 (Special Pamphlet 1979); Ky. REv. STAT. § 311,780 (1978); LA. REv.
STA T. ANN. § 40:1299.35.4 (West Supp. 1979); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1598
(1964); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.412 (West Supp. 1979); RSMo, § 188.030 (1978);
MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 50-20-109 (1978); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-329 (1978);
N.D. CENT.. CODE § 14-02.1-03 (Interim Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
§ 1-732 (West Supp. 1978-1979); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6606 (Purdon 1977);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-301 (1975); UTAH CODE Ai. § 767-302 (1978); Wyo.
STAT. § 35-6-102 (1977).
140. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 112, § 12M (West Supp. 1979); NET. REv. STAT.
§ 442.250 (1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (Supp. 1979); S.D. Comp. LAWS ANN.
§ 34-23A-5 "(1977).
141. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05 (McKinney 1975).
142. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-2 (Burns 1979) ("substantial permanent im-
pairment"); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.4 (West Supp. 1979) ("permanent
impairment"); MAss. GEN. LAwS ANN. ch. 112, § 12M (West Supp. 1979) ("sub.
stantial risk of grave impairment"); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-329 (1978) ("imminent
peril ... substantially endangers"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (Supp. 1979) ("sub-
stantial risk ... gravely impair"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03 (Interim Supp.
1979) ("substantial risk of grave impairment"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-302 (1978)
("serious and permanent damage"); Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-102 (1977) ("imminent
peril ... substantially endangers").
143. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 165.
144. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. at 388-89.
145. Id. at 400.
146. See notes 112-17 and accompanying text supra.
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stages of pregnancy, in derogation of the post-viability compelling state
interest in potential life. Nevertheless, the Court's dicta seem to require
that illogical result.147
C. The Requirement of Consultation
After Viability
Six states, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, and North
Dakota, require that a physician planning to perform a post-viability
abortion consult with one or two other physicians and certify that the
abortion is necessary for the preservation of the woman's life or health and
that the consulting physicians have examined the patient and agree with
the attending physician's judgment.148 Florida, South Carolina, and Virgin-
ia impose the same requirement during the last trimester.149
In Doe v. Bolton, the Supreme Court invalidated the Georgia statutory
requirement that two physicians confirm the attending physician's judg-
ment that an abortion is necessary. The statute applied throughout preg-
nancy. The Court stressed that the attending physician's judgment should
be sufficient and that the doctor will know when consultation is advisable.
The Court stated that "[r]equired acquiescence by co-practitioners has no
rational connection with a patient's needs and unduly infringes on the
physician's right to practice."'150
An Illinois requirement that two physicians other than the attending
physician be consulted prior to a post-viability abortion was invalidated
in Wynn v. Scott.15' The district court found no direct relationship between
the state's interests in preserving maternal and fetal health and "the
number of physicians participating in the [abortion] decision."'152
While the required concurrence arguably has no rational connection
to the patient's needs, it may, despite the Illinois district court's conclusion,
have a rational connection to the protection of a state's compelling interest
in the potential life of a viable fetus. In Doe v. Deschamps, 53 a federal
district court upheld a Montana statutory requirement that the aborting
physician consult two other physicians before aborting a viable fetus in
an abortion not necessary to save the woman's life. The court distinguished
Doe v. Bolton on the ground that the Georgia statute applied to all
abortions, not just those performed after viability. The district court quoted
147. Colautti v. Franklin, 489 U.S. at 400; Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 192; Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153.
148. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1202 (1977); IDAHO CODE § 18-608 (1979); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, § 81-25 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.4
(West Supp. 1979); MONT. REV. CODEs ANN. § 50-20-109 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 14.02.1-04 (Interim Supp. 1979).
149. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.225 (West Supp. 1979); S.C. CODE § 4441-20 (1976);
VA. CODE § 18.2-74 (1975).
150. 410 U.S. at 199.
151. 449 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Ill.), appeal dismissed, 489 U.S. 8 (1978).
152. Id. at 1319.
158. 461 F. Supp. 682 (D. Mont. 1976).
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language from Roe v. Wade indicating that the state's compelling interest
after viability allows it to prescribe guidelines based on "appropriate
medical judgment," rather than the "medical judgment of the pregnant
woman's attending physician" relied on exclusively during the first
trimester. After viability, the woman's privacy right, which precludes
or severely limits pre-viability state regulation, must be balanced against
the state's compelling interest in potential life. The Montana district
court said that after viability, "[t]he will of the woman and her
physician are no longer of primary consideration. Medical judgments
may vary greatly in this complex area, and the State may properly
require more than the opinion of the woman's attending physician to
insure that the potentiality of life is not destroyed."'154
Should the Montana district court's reasoning prove acceptable to the
Supreme Court, a state could require consultation with nonattending
physicians before a post-viability abortion. A statute might provide:
Any physician planning to perform an abortion after the fetus is
viable must certify in good faith that, according to his or her best
medical judgment, the abortion is necessary to preserve the life or
health of the pregnant woman. In addition, two other physicians
must examine the patient and certify in good faith that, according
to their best medical judgment, the abortion is necessary to pre-
serve the life or health of the pregnant woman. The certificates
shall become a part of the patient's medical record under [the
statutory recordkeeping provision].
D. A Duty of Care to the Viable Fetus
During Abortion
Sixteen states impose on the aborting physician a duty of care to the
viable fetus. 155 The provision of the Pennsylvania statute invalidated in
Colautti was especially extensive in requiring the aborting physician to
exercise that degree of professional skill, care and diligence to
preserve the life and health of the fetus which such person would
be required to exercise in order to preserve the life and. health of
any fetus intended to be born and not aborted and the abortion
technique employed shall be that which would provide the best
opportunity for the fetus to be aborted alive so long as a different
technique would not be necessary in order to preserve the life or
health of the mother.156
154. Id. at 689.
155. IDAHO CODE § 18-608(3) (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-26 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1979); IowA CODE § 707.7 (Special Pamphlet 1979); KY. REv. STAT.§ 311.780 (1978); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.4 (West Supp. 1979); MASs.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 112, § 120 (West Supp. 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.412(West Supp. 1979); RSMo § 188.035 (1978); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 50-20-109(1978); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-330 (Supp. 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-05 (In-
terim Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-732 (West Supp. 1979); 35 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6605 (Purdon 1977); TEN. CODE ANN. § 39-306 (Supp. 1979);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-307 (1978); Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-103 (1977).
156. 439 U.S. at 397.
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The chief problem with the statute was that it did not clearly specify
that the pregnant woman's life or health must take precedence over that
of the fetus if the two conflict. 157
The Court's expectation of greater precision should alert states that
careful draftsmanship is necessary when defining the physician's duty of
care. An acceptable statute must emphasize the overriding consideration
of the woman's life and health and give deference to the medical judgment
of the attending physician.
Another desirable component of a duty of care provision is a require-
ment that the viable fetus be treated similarly to a fetus intended to be
born and not aborted, rather than simply requiring medical care for the
fetus. The born-and-not-aborted standard avoids the problem of determin-
ing when live birth occurs in the abortion context.158 The standard is also
flexible enough to allow medical personnel to make judgments about care
of the severely defective fetus similar to those they would make for an
equally burdened premature infant.' 59
Any statute imposing a duty of care on the aborting physician during
the abortion of a viable fetus must give precedence to the pregnant woman's
life and health. 160 Such a statute, however, should also prohibit the abort-
ing physician from deliberately destroying or impairing the health of the
fetus when such action has no relation to the pregnant woman's life or
health. An acceptable statute might be worded thus:
During the abortion of a viable fetus, the aborting physician
shall exercise that degree of professional skill, care, and diligence
to preserve the life and health of the fetus which such person
would be required to exercise in order to preserve the life and
health of any fetus intended to be born and not aborted. If .the
life or health of the pregnant woman would be undesirably af-
fected by the physician's actions consistent with the above man-
date, the physician is excused from such action insofar as it is in-
consistent with the preservation of the woman's life or health.
Under no circumstances may a physician harm the fetus or end
its life unless such conduct is a necessary part of the abortion
method chosen, or unless such conduct is intended to preserve
the life or health of the pregnant woman.
This type of statute clarifies the doctor's role in the abortion process. While
the doctor's first responsibility is to perform the abortion consistent with
157. Id. at 400.
158. See notes 160-64 and accompanying text infra.
159. "[Medical personnel] must be allowed to make a realistic appraisal of
the chances of survival and of quality of life after abortion procedures, and not be
forced by legislation and fear of repercussions into providing care they would
never give to similarly burdened prematures." Bok, The Unwanted Child: Caringfor the Fetus Born Alive After an Abortion, 6 HAsTINGs CENTER REP. No. 5, 10, 11
(1976). See also Note, Birth Defective Infants: A Standard for Nontreatment De-
cisions, 0 STAN. L. Rv. 599 (1978).
160. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. at 400.
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the woman's health, he need not find himself in an adversary relation to
the fetus beyond the unavoidable harm caused by the abortion itself and
the method chosen.
E. Protection of a Fetus Delivered Alive
Twenty states protect the fetus delivered alive, usually declaring that
he or she has equal rights to those of a fetus born alive who was intended
to be born and not aborted.161 Although the requirement of protection of
the viable fetus aborted alive may seem to be so obvious as to render any
statutory mandate unnecessary, the allegation of the defense in the Edelin
trial that a physician cannot be held accountable for the death of a fetus
after a lawful abortion' 62 would indicate that some clarification is desir-
able. Such a statutory provision involves problems, however, one of which
is the necessity of defining when a fetus is "born alive" if different penalties
are to apply after live birth, or if there is no standard of care applicable
until live birth. The standard usually requires that the child exist inde-
pendently and separately from the mother.163
At least one state specifically defines "live birth" in the abortion con-
text. Maine requires that the fetus be completely expelled or extracted
from the mother, and declares that the fetus is born alive if it "breathes
or shows any other evidence of life such as beating of the heart, pulsation
of the umbilical cord or definite movement of voluntary muscles, whether
or not the umbilical cord'has been cut or the placenta is attached." 16 4
Such a definition would allow a fetus to be "born alive"-that is, entitled
to medical care-although the fetus may not be viable-that is, capable of
sustained survival.
A state may not prescribe medical care for a nonviable fetus before
he or she is born, but once born alive, whether capable of sustained survival
or not, the fetus is a human person entitled to the protection of state law.
The purpose of the statute protecting the living aborted infant is not to
require extraordinary or futile treatment of the infant, but rather to avoid
161. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-2301 (Supp. 1979); CAL. HEALTH & SAFE-
TY CODE § 25955.9 (West Supp. 1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1202 (1977); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, § 8126 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-7(b)
(Burns 1979); Ky. REv. STAT. § 311.790 (1978); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:87.5(West Supp. 1980); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1594 (1964); MAss. GEN.
LAWs ANN. ch. 112, § 12P (West Supp. 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 415.145,
.423 (West Supp. 1980); RSMo § 188.035 (1978); MONT. Ruv. CODES ANN.§ 50-20-108 (1978); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-331 (Supp. 1979); N.Y. ExEc. LAW
§ 291-3 (McKinney Supp. 1972-1979); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.1-05,-08 (Interim
Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 524, tit. 63, §§ 1-732,-734 (West Supp. 1979);
35 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 6604 (Purdon 1977); S.D. ComP. LAws ANN. § 34-23A-16.1
(1977); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-302(3), -306 (Supp. 1979); Wyo. STAT. §§ 35-6-103,
-104 (1977).
162. Robertson, After Edelin: Little Guidance, 7 HASTINGS CENTR REP. No. 3,
15, 16 (1977).
163. Comment, supra note 116, at 458-59.
164. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1595 (1964).
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the ethically questionable result that it should be "the fact of abortion
which should in itself determine the fate of the premature baby." 65
An additional requirement imposed by five states having duty of care
provisions, but not yet considered by the Supreme Court, requires that
specific facilities for care of the fetus be available during the abortion of
a viable fetus. Louisiana and Oklahoma require that a doctor be present
to care for the fetus.166 Indiana requires that the abortion facility contain
an intensive care unit for premature infants,167 while Massachusetts and
North Dakota require the presence of life-support equipment. 68
A state could require that medical personnel be present when the
fetus is delivered and that a doctor be immediately available to care for
a live-born fetus.GOO The requirement that a doctor be present to care for
the fetus also may be beneficial to the woman. If the aborting physician
is required to stop, examine the fetus for signs of life, and care for the
live-born fetus, he or she may be unable simultaneously to give appropriate
medical attention to the mother. In addition, the requirement that medical
personnel be present when the fetus is delivered may serve to alleviate some
of the potential psychological complications associated with instillation
method abortions.'7 0
An acceptable statute providing for adequate medical attendance to
the woman and the live-born aborted fetus could be worded as follows:
During any abortion performed after the fetus is viable, a physi-
cian in addition to the aborting physician shall be present when
the fetus is expelled or extracted from the mother to determine
if the fetus has been born alive. Life-support equipment shall
be immediately available to the physician for treatment of the
live-born fetus. A fetus born alive as the result of an abortion
is entitled to the same medical care and treatment that would
be provided to a similarly situated premature infant who was
intended to be born and not aborted. A fetus shall be deemed
"born alive" for the purposes of this statute if he or she is com-
pletely expelled or extracted from the mother's body and if he
or she breathes or shows any other evidence of life such as beat-
ing of the heart, pulsation of the umbilical cord, or definite
movement of voluntary muscles, whether or not the umbilical
cord has been cut or the placenta is attached.
165. Bok, supra note 159, at 11.
166. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.4 (West Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 63, § 1.732 (West Supp. 1979).
167. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-7 (Burns 1979).
168. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 112, § 12P (West Supp. 1979); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-02.1-05 (Interim Supp. 1979).
169. The question of allocation of the costs of personnel and equipment in-
tended for the care of the fetus is beyond the scope of this article. One author has
suggested, however, that such costs would have to be paid by the state, lest the
added expense burden or "chill" the pregnant woman's abortion decision. Com-
ment, supra note 116, at 456 n.64.
170. See notes 45-47 and accompanying text supra.
[Vol. 45
27
Wood and Hawkins: Wood: State Regulation of Late Abortion and the Physician's Duty of Care to the Viable Fetus
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1980
STATE REGULATION OF LATE ABORTION
IV. CONCLUSION
The decision of the Supreme Court in Colautti v. Franklin'71 limits
the right of the states to regulate abortions after viability. The Court's
reluctance to approve arguably constitutional state legislation, its con-
tinuing emphasis on the aborting physician's discretion, and its inclination
to define the pregnant woman's health in very broad terms, may inhibit
state legislators to the point where they believe attempted regulation is
futile. Nevertheless, there are still available means of protecting the states'
compelling interest in potential life.
It must be emphasized that the language of the Supreme Court in
Roe v. Wade 72 with regard to state regulation of abortion after viability
was permissive rather than mandatory. The Court stated that a state "may,
if it chooses," regulate abortion after viability in order to promote its
interest in the life of the fetus. 173 The Court did not say that a state must
regulate post-viability abortions. The Court's language is consistent with
its unwillingness to find that the fetus is a person within the meaning of
the fourteenth amendment.174 Because the viable or nonviable fetus is not
a constitutional "person," it is difficult to articulate a legal argument that
a state must protect its own compelling interest in the life of the fetus.
There are, however, logical arguments for the proposition that a state
should protect its interest in the life of a viable fetus.
First, the state is the sole guardian of the potential life represented by
the fetus. The husband of the pregnant woman, the father of the unborn
child, and the parents of the pregnant minor are all denied a decisive role
in the abortion choice.1 75 Unless a state exercises its right to regulate
post-viability abortions, only the consciences of the pregnant woman and
of the physicians from whom she seeks an abortion are available to prevent
the unnecessary abortion of a fetus who could be delivered as a healthy
infant in only a few weeks. 176
Second, the Waddill, Edelin, and Floyd prosecutions' 77 illustrate the
need for legislative clarification of the role of the physician during a
post-viability abortion, not only for the protection of the state's interest in
171. 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
172. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
173. Id. at 164-65.
174. Id. at 158.
175. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74-75, invalidated provisions
of the Missouri abortion statute requiring spousal or parental consent to abortion.
A recent Supreme Court decision, Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979), con-
cluded that a pregnant minor must be free to convince a court that she is mature
enough to make the abortion decision, or that an abortion is in her best interests
despite her immaturity, "without first consulting or notifying her parents." Id.
at 647-48. The Court recently noted probable jurisdiction in a case upholding the
Utah statutory requirement that a physician notify the parents of a minor woman
prior to performing an abortion. H . L._. v. Matheson, 604 P.2d 907
(Utah 1979), prob. juris. noted, 100 S. Ct. 1077 (1980).
176. See Hack, note 121 supra; Horan, supra note 121, at 297-302.
177. See notes 4-23 and accompanying text supra.
1980]
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the life of the fetus, but also for the protection of the physician. Doctors
should not have to guess at their peril whether to insure the death of the
fetus and risk possible criminal prosecution, or to preserve the fetus' life
and face a possible malpractice claim from a woman who thought a prop-
erly performed abortion should necessarily involve fetal death. A state
statute prohibiting abortion after viability except where it is necessary to
preserve the life or health of the pregnant woman, coupled with the
imposition on the aborting physician of a duty of care toward the viable
fetus both during and after abortion, adequately articulates the state policy
of protecting the potential lives of unborn, viable infants.
Third, the states' protection of potential life is consistent with their
uniform protection of life after birth. Our legal system continues to place
great significance on birth as the point at which various legal rights come
into being.178 The fact that many legal rights are insignificant before an
individual is born alive does not prevent a state from doing all it can to
insure that a viable individual is born alive and cared for in a manner
consistent with the preservation of that life. In earlier ages, when many
of the concepts underlying modern statutes were formed, prenatal develop-
ment was little understood, and birth was viewed as a miraculous and
significant occasion. The child within the womb was a mystery. Today,
physicians can tap the amniotic fluid and discover the details of the fetus'
genetic heritage. They can take ultrasonic "pictures" of the fetus and give
it blood transfusions. 179 Modern science tends to view birth as merely one
stage in the continuous development of a human being.'8 0 It is clear that
a state has an obligation to protect the life of a live-born child. There is
little logical distinction between the live infant and the infant within the
uterus who has the capacity to survive outside the uterus-the former has
simply completed the brief journey through the birth canal. If a state has
an obligation to protect the life of this child the moment after. it is born,
the state undoubtedly should exercise its right to protect this child the
moment before it is born.
178. See, e.g., Comment, Live Birth: A Condition Precedent to Recognition
of Rights, 4 HorsTRA L. Rzv. 805 (1976).
179. OBsTEiUcs AND GYNECOLOGY 45-47, 366-69, 493-94 (3d ed. D. Danforth
1977).
180. Natheson, The Unwanted Child: Caring for the Fetus Born Alive After
an Abortion, 6 HASTINGS CENTER REP. No. 5 (1976).
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